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Introduction
When assessing the tenth anniversary of the International Criminal Court, 
one is necessarily confronted with a question as to when is the actual birthday 
of the Court. The institution itself now celebrates 17 July, and it is appar-
ently a much appreciated paid holiday for employees at the Court, who take 
advantage of the day off to soak up the sun at Scheveningen beach. But the 
Court wasn’t really “born” on 17 July, which is the day the Rome Conference 
concluded in 1998 with the famous vote by which the Statute was adopted. 
The Rome Statute requires sixty ratifications for entry into force,1 and this 
was only achieved on 17 April 2002. Article 126 says that entry into force 
takes place about two months after the requisite ratifications, so the magic 
date might be 1 July 2002. It is an important date in any event, because it 
marks the starting point of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.2 But the Court 
wasn’t functional on 1 July 2002. Judges and a Prosecutor had not yet been 
elected, and the subsidiary instruments required by the Statute, the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes had not yet been 
adopted. The Court was only in a position to actually begin its judicial 
activities in June 2003, when the Prosecutor was sworn into office. Thus, 
the Court actually has several possible birthdays. Its employees would no 
doubt be delighted if every one of these were to be celebrated with a paid 
day off. For the purposes of this article, let us say that the Court is “about” 
ten years old. The aim of this short article is to consider some features of the 
institution’s work in this first decade of its activity.
1.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art 129 
(hereinafter Rome Statute). See RS Clark, ‘Article 126’, in O Triffterer (ed), Commen-
tary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd ed, CH Beck et al 2008) 
1775–1776.
2.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 11. See SA Williams, ‘Article 11’, in Triffterer (n 1) ibid. 
539–545.
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Too many judges, too little work
It is often overlooked that when the Rome Statute was adopted, the ad hoc 
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda had been operational and engaged in 
trial work for only a few years. Most of the rich lessons from their activity 
in the procedure (and substance) of international criminal law had yet to 
be learned. Thus, when the first trial began at the International Criminal 
Court in 2009 it was using a procedural model that had been designed more 
than a decade earlier. The invaluable lessons learned from the experience 
of the ad hoc tribunals were not taken into account at all.
The procedural system of the United Nations international tribunals had 
been largely left to the judges, whereas that of the International Criminal 
Court was more rigorously codified by the states that negotiated the Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Many felt the Rome system 
was better, and certainly it more closely resembled models in domestic 
legal systems. But while this may have been an advantage, there were also 
disadvantages with the inflexibility of the scheme. At the United Nations 
tribunals, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence have been subjected to a 
constant process of fine tuning and amendment. The judges have adjusted 
the procedure in light of experience but also to accommodate changes in 
the nature of the case load. Although the same should be possible at the 
International Criminal Court, in practice there is nothing of the sort. The 
Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence have never been amended. While 
complex when compared with the ad hoc tribunals, the amending process 
at the Court should not be so terribly difficult. On closer examination, it 
seems that the failure to amend the procedural regime is not so much a 
function of the difficulty of the process as a genuine resistance to the idea.
Outside the Court’s own institutions, much thought is given to amend-
ment among academics.3 But within the Court, and the Assembly of States 
Parties, the idea took hold that it was premature to contemplate amend-
ments with respect to the procedure, structures and other operational 
aspects. The theory was that a “full cycle” (arrest, confirmation hearing, 
trial, appeal) should be completed before any changes would be considered. 
The approach contrasts rather sharply with the attitude taken at the ad hoc 
tribunals. Perhaps there is some merit in this more conservative and cautious 
3.  RS Clark, ‘Possible Amendments for the First ICC Review Conference in 2009’ (2007) 
4 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 103 and C Burchard, O Triffterer and J 
Vogel (eds), The Review Conference and the Future of the International Criminal Court (Kluwer 
Law International 2010).
2
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position. It may be the reflection of the involvement of diplomats both in 
the Assembly of States Parties and within the Court itself (where they are, 
strictly speaking, former diplomats). Diplomats might be nervous about 
reopening compromises that were negotiated with difficulty, fearful that 
one change would lead to a cascade. Thus, although given the opportunity 
to make minor (and perhaps major) repairs to the system at the Kampala 
Review Conference, there was a refusal to consider the matter. Instead, 
much time was consumed at Kampala with a series of “stocktaking ses-
sions,” which were a mix of academic conference and NGO campaign 
meeting. While interesting and worthwhile in a sense, they hardly merited 
the expense and energy of bringing more than a thousand people to cen-
tral Africa. The term “stocktaking” implied introspection, but there was 
very little of that in reality. Most of the sessions involved hectoring States 
Parties about their obligations to the Court, rather than reflection on the 
problems within the Court. There was also a sense that these and similar 
activities had been conceived rather late in the preparations for Kampala 
once it was understood that the agenda of amendments—which was, after 
all, the purpose of the Review Conference—would be rather more slender 
than many observers would have expected.
Actually, it takes little imagination to see how the procedure can be 
improved, the pre-trial and trial activity simplified, and the Court made 
more efficient. In that sense, the Kampala Conference was a missed oppor-
tunity. An unfortunate message was delivered of an institution that is rather 
reluctant to acknowledge its shortcomings and that seems content with its 
performance.
One of the innovations in the Rome Statute is the confirmation hearing, 
the preliminary proceeding at which the Pre-Trial Chamber is to determine 
whether there are “substantial grounds” to go to trial.4 The confirmation 
hearing can add up to a year to the length of the proceedings as a whole. 
Its enthusiasts explain that it adds a layer of protection against abusive trials, 
which may well be true. In four cases, the confirmation hearing resulted 
in dismissal of the charges, which is reassuring to defense lawyers (and 
troubling, to the extent that it reflects misjudgment by the Prosecutor).5 
4.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 61. See K Shibahara and WA Schabas, ‘Article 61’, in Triffterer 
(n 1) 1171–1181.
5.  Prosecutor v Abu Garda (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-02/05-02/09 
(8 February 2010); Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision on the confirmation of 
charges) ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red Pre-Trial Chamber I (16 December 2011); Prosecutor 
v Callixte Mbarushimana  (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision 
3
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But in all such arguments, a cost-benefit analysis is central. Is the added 
length to the proceedings, especially if the accused is in custody, worth 
the investment in time and resources that is involved?
The closest that the ad hoc tribunals come to a confirmation hearing is the 
so-called Rule 61 Procedure. Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the ad hoc tribunals, when an arrest warrant cannot be executed there 
is a special procedure at which evidence may be produced and witnesses 
called. The accused is, of course, not present at the hearing, and may not 
even be represented by counsel.6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Trial 
Chamber may determine “there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged in the indict-
ment.” Rule 61 was adopted as a compromise intended to assuage critics 
from continental European justice systems who charged that the lack of an 
in absentia procedure would seriously hamper the work of the Tribunal.7 
The main distinction is that a Rule 61 proceeding does not pronounce a 
sentence. In the early years of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, several hearings were held pursuant to Rule 61, but 
the practice was discontinued once the Tribunal had defendants in custody 
and the suggestion that it could only function if it could conduct in absentia 
hearings no longer made any sense.8 Reflecting on the procedure, Louise 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the confirmation of 
charges’) ICC-01/04-01/10-514 Appeals Chamber (30 May 2012); Prosecutor v Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) ICC-
01/09-02/11-382-Red Pre-Trial Chamber II (23 January 2012); Prosecutor v William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) ICC-01/09-01/11-373-Red 
Pre-Trial Chamber II (23 January 2012).
6.  Prosecutor v Karadžić et al (Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61 (11 July 1996) para 4. But 
see Prosecutor v Rajić (Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-12-R61 (13 September 1996); Prosecutor v Rajić (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Sidhwa) IT-95-12-R61 (13 September 1996) paras 10–16.
7.  Prosecutor v Rajić (n 6). ‘A Rule 61 proceeding is not a trial in absentia. There is no 
finding of guilt in this proceeding’. Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Review of Indictment 
Pursuant to Rule 61) IT-94-2-R61 (20 October 1995): ‘The Rule 61 procedure [ . . . ] can-
not be considered a trial in absentia: it does not culminate in a verdict nor does it deprive 
the accused of the right to contest in person the charges brought against him before the 
Tribunal.’
8.  See F Patel King, ‘Public Disclosure in Rule 61 Proceedings Before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1997) 29 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 523; M Thieroff and EA Amley, Jr, ‘Proceeding to Justice and 
Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia and Rule 61’ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 231; BT Hildreth, ‘Hunting 
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Arbour said it was “detrimental” to the work of the Prosecutor.9 Neither 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda nor the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone ever showed any interest in Rule 61 proceedings. They are 
now little more than a footnote, and with hindsight look like efforts to 
create work for judges and prosecutors at an institution without defendants. 
In that sense, there are obvious similarities with the confirmation hearing 
of the International Criminal Court. As the institution gets busier, it seems 
likely that the confirmation hearing will be reduced in scale until at some 
point there is a willingness to eliminate it altogether.
The Regulations of the Court require that the decision on the confirmation 
hearing be issued within sixty days of its conclusion.10 Working within this 
requirement, the Pre-Trial Chambers have issued lengthy rulings in which 
the facts and law are reviewed.11 The time limit is useful, because where 
one is not imposed, the judges generally take much, much longer to issue 
written rulings. On the arguably simpler issue of whether or not to issue an 
arrest warrant, they have sometimes taken several months.12 By comparison, 
issuance of an arrest warrant at the ad hoc tribunals is a matter of a few days.
Questions about the utility of the confirmation hearing inexorably lead 
to thoughts about the value of the Pre-Trial Chamber itself. Again, this is a 
feature introduced in the Rome Statute that has no equivalent at the ad hoc 
tribunals, where the same issues are very adequately dealt with by a single 
pre-trial judge. A minimum of one-third of the entire cohort of judges 
at the International Criminal Court is tied up with this pre-trial work. If 
the Chamber were abolished, there would be more judges for trials which 
are, after all, the bread and butter of the institution.
At the other end of the system sits the Appeals Chamber. There was 
no appeal at Nuremberg or Tokyo. When the Yugoslavia Tribunal was 
the Hunters: The United Nations Unleashes its Latest Weapon in the Fight against Fugitive 
War Crimes Suspects—Rule 61’ (1998) 6 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 499; AL Quintal, ‘Rule 61: The “Voice of the Victims” Screams Out for Justice’ (1998) 
36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 723.
9.  L Arbour, ‘The Crucial Years’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 397.
10.  Regulations of the Court, Adopted by the judges of the Court (26 May 2004) ICC-
BD/01-01-4 Reg 53.
11.  For example, Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges) 
ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007); Prosecutor v Katanga et al (Decision on the Con-
firmation of the Charges) ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008); Prosecutor v Bemba 
(Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009).
12.  For example, Prosecutor v Bashir (Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a War-
rant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09 (4 March 2009).
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established in the early 1990s, the text of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights made an effective right of appeal a sine qua non. 
Proposing inclusion of a right of appeal for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the 
Secretary-General’s Report said “such a right is a fundamental element of 
individual civil and political rights and has, inter alia, been incorporated in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For this reason, the 
Secretary-General has proposed that there should be an Appeals Chamber.”13
The implication, confirmed by the reference to Article 14 of the Interna-
tional Covenant, was that this was to be an appeal from the final verdict. The 
corresponding provision, Article 25 of the Statute of Yugoslavia Tribunal 
said: “The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by 
the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds.”14 
But the judges themselves soon determined that in addition to an appeal 
of conviction—the only requirement imposed by human rights law—that 
interlocutory matters could also be dealt with.15 The idea stuck, and was 
incorporated in the Rome Statute.16
By the time the International Criminal Court completed its first full cycle 
of judicial elections in early 2012, a full-time five-judge Appeals Chamber 
(together with professional assistants and secretarial help) had occupied 
a floor of the Court’s premises for nearly the entire period without ever 
engaging in the fundamental reason for its existence: appeal by an accused 
of a conviction. The Appeals Chamber has barely managed to keep itself 
occupied with interlocutory appeals. The occasional decisions are generally 
sparsely reasoned and there are few separate or dissenting opinions. The 
job could very well have been accomplished with a panel of part-time or 
standby judges, called to The Hague as required and remunerated according 
to the work that they actually accomplish.
Would the sky fall in if there was no interlocutory appeal at all? There 
might be variations in procedure from one chamber to another, but that 
is something that many justice systems accept as a fact of life. Some argue 
the virtue of “clarifying” the law so as to ensure “legal certainty.” But it 
might be more constructive for a Court in its early years to “let a hundred 
flowers bloom,” and to encourage experimentation and innovation. The 
13.  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph (2) of Security Council Reso-
lution 808 (1993), UN Doc S/25704 (1993) para 116.
14.  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc S/
RES/827 (1993), annex, Art 25(1) (hereinafter ICTY Statute).
15.  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 72(B), 73(B), 108bis(A).
16.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 82. See C Staker, ‘Article 82’, in Triffterer (n 1) 1475–1480.
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Rome Statute contemplates a division of labor whereby the Pre-Trial and 
Trial Chambers are enriched by a large proportion of judges with criminal 
trial experience. That makes sense. But the consequence may be that there 
is less criminal trial experience at the Appeals Chamber, and a tendency 
for it to be top-heavy with judges from the international law stream. This 
means that tricky determinations about trial procedure made by experienced 
judges working at the coal face are being second-guessed by those who are 
probably less familiar with daily life in the courtroom.
A much-heralded innovation in the Rome Statute is the recognition 
of a role for victims of crime. The Statute’s provisions concerning victim 
participation might well have been interpreted relatively narrowly. Instead, 
an elaborate and costly regime of victim representation and participation 
has developed. Much of the institutional energy of the Court in its first 
decade has been devoted to addressing this. But it is not apparent that the 
right scheme for victim participation has been found. One suspects that if 
the victims understood that many millions had been invested—mainly in 
professional salaries and international travel—in order to ensure the respect 
of their rights, they might ask if they could simply be given the money 
instead. The continental procedural model of the partie civile on which victim 
participation was premised seems very remote from what we actually see 
in the Chambers of the International Criminal Court.
One example of this indulgence is the Trust Fund for Victims, whose 
establishment is called for by Article 79 of the Rome Statute.17 As it was 
understood, this was to provide a mechanism for seizing the assets of the 
wealthy warlords and tyrants upon successful prosecution by the Court. 
Of course, to date it has collected nothing of the sort, because no trials 
have been completed. It was probably unrealistic to view the defendants 
as a reliable source of resources that might be used to address issues of 
compensation and restitution for victims. At the ad hoc tribunals, most of 
the defendants have been declared indigent for the purposes of legal aid. 
Even the notorious Charles Taylor, widely alleged to have billions tucked 
away in foreign bank accounts, was not declared to be capable of paying 
his own lawyers’ fees because the money could not be found. And proof 
of assets for the purposes of legal aid should not be nearly as demanding as 
for the seizure of bank accounts and other property.
The Fund itself gets a limited income in the form of voluntary contri-
butions from the wealthier States Parties. The money is being spent on a 
17.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 79. See M Jennings, ‘Article 79’, in Triffterer (n 1) 1439–1442.
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range of projects in regions where the Court is active. For the year 2010, the 
Fund expected an income of something under 2 million euro in such gifts. 
It had budgeted an operating cost of 1.2 million euro. This is an expensive 
way to do what amounts to overseas development assistance. Maybe States 
should give their money to the UNDP or Oxfam, and let the Trust Fund 
become inoperative until such time as the Prosecutor is astute enough to 
catch a wealthy defendant.
The Challenge of Selecting Situations and Cases
Although the procedural issues pose interesting challenges, it may be 
that the crux of the difficulty facing the International Criminal Court is 
substantive. After all, this is where the real differences lie between the Court 
and the ad hoc institutions. James Crawford, who chaired the International 
Law Commission drafting committee in the early 1990s, has said that the 
statute it prepared was what the Commission thought would meet general 
acceptance. Professor Crawford has suggested that the world may not have 
been ready for the more radical concepts that emerged from the Rome 
Conference. If he is right, this may help us to understand the difficulties 
that the Court faces in becoming operational and effective.
The Rome Statute makes an important distinction between “situa-
tions” and “cases.” The process of prosecution begins with identification 
of a “situation” rather than a “case.” Thus, we have the “Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo” and the “case” of Thomas Lubanga, 
leader of a combatant faction in a civil war accused of recruiting child 
soldiers. There is the “Situation in northern Uganda” and the “case” of 
Joseph Kony, head of the Lord’s Resistance Army.
The great originality of the International Criminal Court compared 
with all of its predecessors is that the Prosecutor selects both the “situation” 
and the “case.” At the other institutions, starting with Nuremberg, the 
“situation” has invariably been selected by the political body that created 
the tribunal. The Prosecutor at these institutions only selects the “case.” 
In 1945, the four-power London Conference charged the International 
Military Tribunal with delivering justice to “the major war criminals of 
the European axis.” The four prosecutors concurred about the individuals 
they would prosecute. Even there, it seems they were instructed by their 
various governments in making this choice. In the course of the trial, the 
judges heard evidence of war crimes perpetrated by the Allied forces—the 
8
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Katyn massacre, unrestricted naval warfare—but were without jurisdiction 
to address these issues. Had one or more of the prosecutors suggested that 
these matters be dealt with in the interests of “balance” and fairness, he 
would have been quickly replaced by someone prepared to live within the 
Tribunal’s mandate.
When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was 
established in 1993, it was said that the shortcomings at Nuremberg had been 
corrected. A specific provision in the Statute enshrines the independence 
of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor is appointed by the Security Council, 
and “shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from 
any other source.”18 But he or she must still live within the confines of 
the narrow jurisdictional scheme established by the Security Council. At 
the ad hoc tribunals, the Prosecutor’s discretion is limited to the choice of 
“cases.” The “situation,” on the other hand, is part of his job description 
and he cannot change it. This was also the International Law Commission’s 
vision of the prosecutor of an international criminal court, but one that 
the Rome Conference did not endorse. Indeed, the proprio motu prosecutor 
enshrined in Article 15 of the Rome Statute has been held out as one of 
the great achievements of the negotiations.19
Political factors are not entirely absent in the selection of “situations” 
at the International Criminal Court. Alongside the proprio motu author-
ity of the Prosecutor is the power given to the Security Council20 and to 
States Parties21 to refer “situations,” thereby “triggering” the exercise of 
jurisdiction, to use the jargon of the Court. But it is a trigger with a safety 
catch, because the Prosecutor is not obliged to proceed at the behest of the 
Security Council or a State Party. He or she may even decline to pursue 
the agenda set by the Security Council or a State Party, subject to a vague 
and untested degree of judicial supervision.22 To date, the Prosecutor has 
never resisted the initiatives of the Security Council or States Parties. In 
the case of the four self-referrals, from Uganda, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Mali, in practice these 
18.  ICTY Statute (n 14) Art 16(2).
19.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 15. See M Bergsmo & J Pejić, ‘Article 15’, in Triffterer (n 1) 
581–593.
20.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 13(b). See SA Williams and WA Schabas, ‘Article 13’, in 
Triffterer (n 1) 563–574.
21.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 14. See A Marchesi, ‘Article 14’, in Triffterer (n 1) 575–579.
22.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 53. See M Bergsmo and P Kruger, ‘Article 53’, in Triffterer (n 
1) 1065–1076.
9
Schabas: The International Criminal Court at Ten
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2015
89Schabas  The International Criminal Court at Ten
were instigated by the Prosecutor rather than the State Party concerned. It 
seems likely that the referral letters were drafted in The Hague and simply 
sent to the national capitals for signature. The Security Council referrals 
of the situations in Darfur and Libya were welcomed because they brought 
the Court to the center of some of the great international crises of the day. 
Indeed, it was for situations like Darfur and Libya that the International 
Criminal Court was created.
The enthusiasm for the proprio motu Prosecutor was the result of two 
different and perhaps somewhat disparate objectives: to free the Court from 
the hegemony of the Security Council, and to create an institution where 
the decisions about targets for prosecution are based upon judicial rather 
than political criteria. One nourished the other. Adversaries of the Security 
Council invoked the goal of an apolitical prosecutor without giving much 
thought to how this would work in practice. Fans of the independent and 
impartial prosecutor transposed models from domestic justice systems, where 
all serious crimes against the person receive attention, without adequate 
reflection about the different imperatives of an international system.
When Luis Moreno-Ocampo took office in June 2003, he could build on 
much experience from his predecessors at Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague 
and Arusha. But in the selection of “situations,” he was in virgin territory. 
A team of lawyers hired to set up the Office had prepared draft Regulations 
that attempted to parse the matter of selecting situations. The initial draft 
Regulations contemplated a highly transparent process of the selection of 
situations based upon objective judicial standards. The Prosecutor himself 
quickly understood that the Rome Statute did not provide much guidance 
on what those standards really were. Moreover, he was astute enough to 
recognize that mechanistic application of regulations such as those drafted 
by the advance team might have unexpected consequences that would be 
politically unwise. In the result, the draft Regulations were not adopted. 
Much later, the Prosecutor proposed Regulations where the issue of selec-
tion of situations was addressed in a vague manner, and in such a way as 
to provide him with essentially unlimited discretion.
Some students of the Rome Statute have read Article 15 as suggesting 
that the Prosecutor is required to act relying upon information received, 
from whatever source, as long as there is a “reasonable basis” to proceed. 
This is an absurdly unrealistic interpretation in light of the resources of a 
Court that has been barely able to deal with a handful of cases in a decade 
and that now appears overwhelmed by the new situations that have arisen 
10
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quite unpredictably in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. The drafters at Rome 
gave little thought as to the basis on which the Prosecutor would exercise 
his phenomenal discretion. Had they done so, it is likely that they would 
have been unable to agree. When they attempted to codify the exercise of 
the authority to decline to proceed in the case of referral by the Security 
Council or a State Party, the best they could come up with was “inter-
ests of justice” as a criterion. It was a way of avoiding clarification and it 
amounted to a lack of regulation, although there have been naïve attempts 
to interpret the “interests of justice” formulation so as to make it say more 
than it really does.
The Rome Statute itself advances three concepts that may assist in the 
application of prosecutorial discretion: complementarity, gravity and the 
“interests of justice.” The first of these creates a presumption in favor of 
national jurisdictions, directing the Court not to proceed when national 
jurisdictions are willing or able to prosecute. Article 17 of the Statute offers 
some instruction about the scope of “unwillingness” and “inability.”23 
The issues lend themselves to a reasonably objective assessment. The same 
cannot be said of such stunningly nebulous concepts as “gravity” and the 
“interests of justice.” These notions are so malleable as to provide any 
imaginative prosecutor with a rationale for what may be, in reality, rather 
arbitrary choices.
In order to avoid the challenge of selecting situations, early in his term 
the Prosecutor essentially abdicated the responsibility. He rather quietly 
encouraged some States to refer situations to the Court and then proceeded 
on this basis without challenging the validity of such choices. He used a 
novel interpretation of Article 14, by which States could “self-refer” situa-
tions within their own territory. The Prosecutor explained that States Parties 
had decided to refer the situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and the Central African Republic, and acted as if he was 
virtually bound to proceed in the absence of evidence that the situations 
were inadmissible. The Prosecutor did the same when the Security Council 
referred the “situation in Darfur,” in March 2005.
This was an expedient by which the Prosecutor avoided selecting a situa-
tion on his own. But even then, it soon became apparent that situations were 
a Matrioshka doll, and that there were situations within situations. When 
he obtained the first arrest warrants, in 2005, in the “situation in Uganda,” 
23.  Rome Statute (n 1) Art 17. See SA Williams and WA Schabas, ‘Article 17’, in Triffterer 
(n 1) 605–625.
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the targets were the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels. The big human rights 
NGOs took the Prosecutor to task for failing to proceed against the pro-
government forces as well. It was at this point that he discovered “gravity”, 
a term buried in the Statute and essentially forgotten or overlooked, until 
that point, by academic writers in the major commentaries.24 Justifying his 
focus on the rebels, the Prosecutor said they were killing many more people 
than the government forces, and this meant they should be prioritized by the 
Court. He suggested he would get to the pro-government forces later, but 
never did. There was the lingering suspicion of an agreement, or perhaps 
only a tacit understanding, by which Museveni’s helpful “self-referral” of 
the situation in Northern Uganda meant the focus would be on Museveni’s 
enemies rather than on himself.
In practice, it seemed that the fabled de-politicized Prosecutor was in 
fact not immune to political factors. Soon, gravity was invoked once again 
to explain why the Prosecutor had decided to reject the many complaints 
about violations of the Rome Statute perpetrated by British troops in Iraq. 
He explained that many more people were being killed in Uganda and in 
the Congo, so these areas deserved the attention of the Court as a priority. 
The explanation was unconvincing, because the evidence of the massive 
death toll in Iraq was notorious. The Prosecutor seemed to be confusing 
“situations” and “cases”, comparing the “cases” of alleged deaths in British 
custody in Iraq with the “situations” of mass killings in Uganda and the 
Congo. Days later, he announced that he was proceeding against Thomas 
Lubanga, a Congolese warlord, on charges of recruitment of child soldiers. 
But if the Democratic Republic of the Congo was inherently more serious 
than Iraq, because of the number of deaths, why wasn’t the Prosecutor 
dealing with murder rather than that arguably less important crime of 
recruitment?
James Crawford may well have been right to suggest that the world 
is not ready for a Court with an independent and impartial prosecutor, 
analogous to what we expect in the national justice system of a functional, 
democratic society that is based upon the rule of law. International human 
24.  SA Williams, ‘Article 17’, in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Nomos 1999) 393. See also M Bergsmo and P Kruger, ‘Article 
53’, in ibid. 708–709; JT Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, in A 
Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary vol I (OUP 2002) 667–686; G Turone, ‘Powers and Duties of the Prosecu-
tor’, in ibid. 1153–1154; É David, ‘La Cour pénale internationale’ (2005) 313 Recueil des 
cours 248–251.
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rights courts, like the European Court of Human Rights, have held that 
there is a procedural obligation upon States to investigate and prosecute 
all serious crimes against the person. But the theory does not lend itself 
to a simplistic application in the international criminal law environment. 
The International Criminal Court cannot prosecute all atrocities that go 
unpunished at the national level. Choices are inevitable. The Prosecutor 
claims he makes them on the basis of judicial standards. But the whiff of 
politics is inescapable.
Possibly this is what really ails the Court. Seductive as the vision of an 
independent Prosecutor may be, the idea that the choices of situations are 
left to one unaccountable individual, who employs vague concepts of “grav-
ity” and “interests of justice” to explain these, is perhaps not the Court’s 
greatest strength but rather its greatest flaw. At the Rome Conference, the 
drive to eliminate a role for the Security Council in the determination of 
“situations” was understandable. But it may have caused another problem 
in the neglect of the ineluctable role of politics. The challenge, as the Court 
enters its second decade, may be to find ways to remedy the situation by 
governing and regulating the role of political factors in the choice of “situ-
ations” rather than pretending that they are simply absent.
Towards the second decade
There is a strong impression that after the euphoric success of the Rome 
Conference and the precocious entry into force of the Statute, the actual 
operations of the Court have been a disappointment. Afflicted with a cum-
bersome and inflexible procedural regime, there is nevertheless resistance 
to contemplation of any reforms. The Court lacks vision and leadership. 
Its employees exude frustration and even demoralization. The ardor of the 
African states that ratified the Statute in large numbers, proving its appeal 
to countries of the South confronted with internal conflict, has cooled.
Compare this with the accomplishments of the United Nations tribunals 
at a similar stage in their development. Nine years after the adoption of 
the Security Council resolution establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it had completed the trials of twenty-
five accused persons. In eighteen cases, even the appeals were finished. 
Forty-six people were in detention in The Hague, compared with five 
for the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda cannot claim to have been quite as productive, but its 
performance is still rather stellar when set beside that of the International 
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Criminal Court. Nine years after its establishment, it had completed the 
trials of thirteen accused. Several appeals had also been adjudicated. And 
at the same age, the Special Court for Sierra Leone had completed three 
trials of nine defendants through to the appeals stage.
The Prosecutor has been rather dismissive of criticism about the Court’s 
poor performance. Yet he has himself been responsible for forecasts that 
have failed to materialize. A year after taking office, the Prosecutor pro-
posed a budget based upon the proposition that “[i]n 2005, the Office 
plans to conduct one full trial, begin a second and carry out two new 
investigations.”25 A flow chart derived from the Prosecutor’s plans indi-
cated that the first trial before the Court would be completed by August 
2005.26 He became somewhat less ambitious in 2006, when a three-year 
strategic plan proclaimed the expectation that the Court would complete two 
“expeditious trials by 2009, and . . . conduct four to six new investigations.”27 
In fact, only one trial started in 2009. No reasonable observer would use 
the adjective “expeditious” to describe its glacial pace. In February 2010, 
a new three-year strategic plan from the Office of the Prosecutor said the 
Court would finish the three trials then underway or about to begin, and 
start “at least one new trial.” In addition, the Prosecutor said he intended 
to continue ongoing investigations in seven cases, and conduct “up to four 
new investigations of cases.”28 In fact, by early 2011 not even one trial was 
even close to completion. The first judgment only came in early 2012, 
seven years behind schedule, and was followed by a second at the end of 
the year.29 These mistaken projections reflect an unrealistic assessment of 
the difficulties facing the institution.
But there are many encouraging signs that it continues to enjoy the 
confidence of a large number of States, including many who have yet to 
join the Court. In early 2011, the Court presented itself as one of the useful 
options to deal with evolving crises in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. When the 
Security Council referred Libya to the Court, both the Prosecutor and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber reacted with a sense of urgency that neither had shown 
25.  Draft Programme Budget for 2005, ICC-ASP/3/2 para 159.
26.  Ibid. 49.
27.  OTP, ‘Report on Prosecutorial Strategy’ (14 September 2006) 3.
28.  OTP, ‘Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009–2012’ (1 February 2010) 2.
29.  By the end of 2012, the Court had delivered two trial judgments in cases against 
Thomas Lubanga Dylo and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. (See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylo 
(Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) and Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo 
(Judgment) ICC-01/04-02/12 (18 December 2012).)
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years earlier when it had been asked to do the same thing in Darfur. Another 
sign of health is the successful adoption of amendments at the Kampala 
Conference that will eventually permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression. While the pace of ratification has slowed, 
political changes such as the jasmine revolution in the Arab countries open 
up new opportunities. Tunisia’s accession to the Rome Statute in June 2011 
is a positive indication in this respect.
The Court remains confronted by the need to address shortcomings that 
have manifested themselves in its first years of operation. Other international 
courts and tribunals—the International Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights, for example—also face challenges to adjust as 
the world changes around them. But there is confidence in their continued 
existence as a more or less permanent fixture of the global order. This 
cannot yet be said as safely about the International Criminal Court. The 
Court must address its problems with a greater sense of urgency, and one 
of concern that if there is a failure to do so adequately, States may begin 
to lose the enthusiasm for the institution with which it has been blessed 
since the 1990s.
Note: This contribution, which served as the basis for the key-note speech by Profes-
sor Schabas at the conference on tenth anniversary of the ICC (21 June 2012, London), 
is an update of an article first published in (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum and adjusted 
for the publication in this book. Reprinted with permission of the author and publisher 
(Springer).
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